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At the descriptive level, certainly, you would expect different cultures to develop
different sorts of ethics and obviously they have; that doesn’t mean that you can’t think
of overarching ethical principles you would want people to follow in all kinds of places.
-Peter Singer
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ABSTRACT
Previous research has started to map the moral domain for individual actors. In particular,
Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, 2007, 2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004)
have extended the moral domain beyond the traditional notions of justice and rights
concerns. From this line of research, moral foundations theory emerged, which holds
moral intuitions derive from innate psychological mechanisms that co-evolved with
cultural institutions and practices. However, to date, there has not been a systematic
demonstration of how these moral foundations operate within intergroup settings. JanoffBulman and Carnes (2013) have proposed a comprehensive model of the moral landscape
that includes a group component; however, this model has received some criticism (e.g.,
Graham, 2013). The current study examined how moral foundations operate from a group
perspective. Moreover, potential outgroup moderators of moral foundations were
examined. Participants were placed into one of two conditions in which they rated the
extent to which various concerns were relevant when making moral judgments about
their ingroup and various outgroups. Two sets of three different outgroups conforming to
the various quadrants of the stereotype content model were used. Results showed
significant differences for the harm, fairness, and loyalty foundations between ingroups
and outgroups. Moreover, the type of outgroup significantly influenced moral
foundations scores. Taken together, these findings demonstrate the importance of
considering moral foundations at the group level.
vii

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Recently, researchers have begun mapping the moral domain that individuals use
to make moral judgments. In particular, work by Haidt and colleagues (Haidt, 2007,
2008; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) has expanded notions of the moral
domain beyond the justice and rights concerns of individuals traditionally associated with
moral psychology. Indeed, an oft-cited definition of morality comes from Turiel (1983,
p.3), who defined the moral domain as “prescriptive judgments of justice, right, and
welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other.” Since there are many
individuals (e.g., conservatives, people of non-Western cultures) who fall outside of this
moral domain, Hadit (2008) put forth an alternative approach to defining morality that
does not exclude moral concerns that involve no harm to people (e.g., obedience, prayer,
purity).
In this new approach, Haidt specified the functions of moral systems rather than
the content of a particular moral judgment: “Moral systems are interlocking sets of
values, practices, institutions, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together
to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible” (p. 70, 2008). Haidt
further described two common kinds of moral systems (i.e., two ways of suppressing
selfishness). Some cultures attempt to suppress selfishness by protecting individuals
directly and by teaching individuals to respect the rights of other individuals. This
1
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individualizing approach focuses on individuals as the locus of moral value. Other
cultures attempt to suppress selfishness by strengthening groups and institutions and by
binding individuals to roles and duties in order to constrain their imperfect natures. This
binding approach focuses on the group as the locus of moral value.
Moral foundations theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) holds
moral intuitions derive from innate psychological mechanisms that co-evolved with
cultural institutions and practices. These innate but modifiable mechanisms provide
socializing agents (e.g., parents) the moral foundations to build on as they teach children
their local virtues, vices, and moral practices.
To derive the moral foundations proposed in moral foundations theory, Haidt and
Joseph (2004) surveyed lists of virtues from various cultures and eras, along with
taxonomies of morality from anthropology, psychology, and evolutionary theories about
human and primate sociality. They looked for cases of virtues or other moral concerns
found widely across cultures for which there were plausible and published evolutionary
explanations of related psychological mechanisms. They found human obsession with
fairness, reciprocity, and justice fit well with writings about reciprocal altruism, and the
human concern with caring, nurturing, and protecting vulnerable individuals fit well with
empathy. Respectively, these were labeled the fairness/reciprocity foundation and the
harm/care foundation. Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) refer to these two foundations as
the individualizing foundations because they are the source of intuitions that emphasize
the rights and welfare of individuals.
However, as mentioned, many people do not limit their virtues to those that
protect individuals. Haidt and Joseph (2004) found virtues of loyalty, patriotism, and self-
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sacrifice aligned with work on the evolution of coalitional psychology. Virtues of
subordinates combined with virtues of authorities matched writings on the evolution of
hierarchy in primates and research on ethic of community. Lastly, virtues of purity and
sanctity that play large roles in religious laws aligned with writings on the evolution of
disgust and contamination sensitivity. Graham and colleagues (2009) refer to these three
foundations (i.e., loyalty, authority, and purity) as the binding foundations because they
are the source of intuitions that emphasize group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control.
Moral foundations theory has received a fair amount of attention in the research
literature. Haidt and colleagues have mostly focused on examining moral foundations
among political ideology groups (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007).
However, because they use self-identified political groups, the results tend to be
correlational in nature. As of yet, there has not been a systematic demonstration of how
these moral foundations operate within intragroup and intergroup settings. Systematically
investigating moral foundations within group settings is an important notion to
incorporate into a model of morality because group membership can influence an
individual’s behavior and judgment. For example, groups tend to behave in
uncooperative ways in order to protect or enhance the group compared to individuals who
tend to choose to cooperate in the same situation (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, &
Schopler, 2003). This effect has been termed the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity
effect. Essentially, the finding demonstrates a discontinuity between inter-individual and
inter-group interactions in mixed motive situations (i.e., situations in which individuals or
groups have both common and competing goals). For example, during a prisoner’s
dilemma game, two individuals will typically agree to cooperate and follow through
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when making their individual choices. However, when two groups play the same game,
they tend to agree to cooperate during communication, but in most cases, they choose to
defect when making their actual choices. Thus, instead of exaggerating the individual’s
dominant strategy of cooperation, groups tend to have a dominant strategy of competition
(see Wildschut et al., 2003).
This finding is likely a function of evolutionary adaptations related to the
propensity for humans to live within group contexts (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). Because
survival depended on individuals banding together in groups for strength and safety,
individuals that could come together in order to successfully enhance and protect each
other were more likely to survive. These tendencies are still present and are beneficial in
many contexts. For example, there are groups that work to assist children in need in areas
where there is not enough money for proper nutrition, medicine, or other basic needs
(e.g., Save the Children). Such groups aim to provide children with a healthy start and to
protect them from harm in order to help change the children’s future as well as society’s.
On the other hand, there are other situations in which what is good for the group is not
good for those outside of the group. For instance, joining a gang that is involved in
criminal activity may provide one with a sense of belonging and even be somewhat
financially prosperous for those lacking legitimate means to do so, but the criminal
activities (e.g., graffiti, theft, violence) are often a significant financial, physical, and
psychological drain on the surrounding communities. Furthermore, social identity theory
states group identification directly leads to ingroup favoritism as well as other behaviors
that differentiate one’s group from others (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Work on the role of
groups in evolutionary adaptation of the species argues that living and hunting in groups
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had survival implications and being rejected by the group could lead to starvation and
death (Levine & Kerr, 2007). Thus, the tendency for a group to enhance and protect itself
is likely present and deeply embedded in most group settings. Once group members begin
to think of themselves as a group, they will begin to favor options that protect or enhance
the group welfare (Tindale, Talbot, & Martinez, 2013).
However, protecting the group from harm can only be possible if the group can
readily identify what it needs to be protected from. Not only does the group need to be
able to identify a threat, they must also be able to do this quickly. Thus, categorization of
social units (i.e., stereotypes) serves a very important function for groups. Specifically,
perceivers must use a limited cognitive processing system to cope with the rich and
complex social stimulus environment they live in and they need to understand as well as
anticipate interactions within that environment (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Due to the
limitations of the human cognition system, grouping objects and people into categories
on the basis of their similarities or differences becomes functionally adaptive.
Additionally, a fundamental basis for social categorization is the distinction
between a group to which one belongs (i.e., ingroup) and to those that one does not
belong (i.e., outgroup). For example, Tajfel established what is known as the “minimal
group paradigm” (see Diehl, 1990) to study the influence of social categorization
processes independent of intergroup conflict. In the paradigm, participants are first asked
to make individual judgments about certain stimuli (e.g., evaluate paintings, estimate the
number of dots on a display) and are then given feedback that identifies them as similar
to some of the other participants and as different from the remaining participants (e.g.,
similar preference of paintings or over estimating the number of dots). In actuality,
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participants are randomly assigned to one of the two groups without knowing what
group the other participants are assigned to. Participants are then asked to rate members
of their own and the other group or are asked to allocate resources to these respective
groups. Based on various studies using this paradigm, the primary finding is that
participants favorably evaluate and allocate more resources to members of their own
group, even though they do not know the specific identities of those in their group (i.e.,
ingroup bias). Thus, the mere perception of belonging to different groups triggers ingroup
favoritism and relative outgroup discrimination. This corroborates Allport’s (1954)
argument that one of the most basic categorization processes consists of people
categorizing each other into ingroups and outgroups. Because of this categorization
process, information is tagged by physical and social distinctions (e.g., race and gender),
within-group differences are minimized, between-group differences are exaggerated, and
group members’ behaviors are interpreted stereotypically (Taylor, 1981; Wilder, 1981).
However, not all stereotypes are alike. For instance, some stereotyped groups are
deemed inept (e.g., elderly people) whereas others are revered are their intellect (e.g.,
Asians). Hence, the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) argues
two dimensions can capture the content of stereotypes: warmth and competence. These
particular dimensions result from interpersonal and intergroup interactions. When
meeting others as individuals or group members, people typically want to know what the
others’ goals will be in relation to the self or ingroup and how effectively the others will
pursue their goals. That is, perceivers want to know the others’ intent and capability.
Respectively, these characteristics correspond to perceptions of warmth and competence
(Fiske et al., 2002).
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Stereotype content tends to result from shared public views of groups. Fiske and
colleagues (2002) argue that such cultural stereotypes result from social structural
relations in two primary ways. First, outgroups are perceived as more competent to the
extent they are seen as powerful and high in status or are perceived as less competent to
the extent they are seen as less powerful and low in status. The link between a group’s
societal outcomes and its perceived competence may represent a form of correspondence
bias (i.e., peoples’ behavior reflects their traits) or reflect just-world thinking (i.e., people
get what they deserve). At the group level, it justifies the system and legitimizes powerprestige rankings. Fiske and colleagues (2002) also argue intergroup stereotypes function
to justify the status quo. The second way cultural stereotypes result from social structural
relations is outgroups are seen as relatively warm and nice to the extent they do not
compete with others. Competitive outgroups, in contrast, tend to frustrate and annoy.
Thus, they are viewed as having negative intent. Outgroup goals are assumed to interfere
with ingroup goals, so outgroups are not warm. This incompatibility of intergroup goals
is a primary source of negative affect toward outgroups (Fiske et al., 2002). Outgroups
that are low in both warmth and competence also compete with other groups, primarily
for resources instead of status. These groups are often viewed as parasites in the system
and supposedly compete in a zero-sum game of resource allocation. Since their goals are
also incompatible with others (i.e., competitive) they are not considered to be warm. This
is in stark contrast to the ingroup. Since the ingroup does not compete with itself, it is
perceived as warm. Hence, the cultural default group (e.g., middle class, heterosexual,
Christian) is not often seen as competitive because they possess cultural authority (Fiske
et al., 2002).
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Returning to the topic of morality, Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) have
proposed an extended model of the moral landscape that includes a group component;
however, this model has received some criticism (e.g., Graham, 2013). The Model of
Moral Motives (MMM) proposed by Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) includes an
approach-avoidance component as well. One can visualize the MMM by thinking of a 2 x
3 matrix, in which the rows are divided by motives to protect (i.e., avoidance) and
motives to provide (i.e., approach). Each of the columns of the matrix represents a
different focus of moral concern: the self, others, and the group. However, as Graham
(2013) notes, the model contains some ambiguity about how these distinctions are made.
For example, it is unclear whether these distinctions are the targets of moral judgment or
if they represent the locus of moral concern. The former involves the person or thing that
did some moral action whereas the latter involves the thing one is motivated to protect or
provide for. Additionally, the model falls short by excluding the intergroup context. In
the MMM, intergroup conditions are assumed to be a consequence of intragroup
conditions. However, this is not necessarily always true, just as interpersonal conditions
are not simply a consequence of intrapersonal conditions. Moreover, the model posits that
all of the moral foundations, save the harm foundation, are exclusively proscriptive
(avoid) or prescriptive (approach). However, past research has shown the types of moral
concerns covered by the foundations involve both motivations to inhibit the bad and
activate the good (see Graham, 2013).
Following in the fashion of those who have proposed the MMM, the current study
seeks to examine how moral foundations operate from a group perspective. However,
given the approach/avoidance motivation component as well as the criticisms the model
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has received, this study begins at a more fundamental level and focuses purely on the
moral foundations component. Given the propensity for groups to protect themselves and
enhance their own welfare, it is likely that they will be sensitive to threats from outgroups
and thus focus on fairness, reciprocity, and justice. This sensitivity to outgroup threat
means groups would be sensitive to concerns relating to the individualizing foundations
of harm and fairness (i.e., hypothesis 1). However, when judging the ingroup, virtues of
loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice for the group should surface. These virtues would
have made it possible for groups to initially band together for strength and safety. Thus,
when judging their ingroup (as opposed to outgroups), individuals will be more likely to
utilize the binding foundations (i.e., loyalty, authority, and purity), as these foundations
emphasize group-binding loyalty, duty, and self-control (i.e., hypothesis 2).
However, the stereotype content model argues that different outgroups can
promote different reactions and expectations. Thus, differing types of outgroups may
moderate the moral foundations that are utilized by group members (i.e., hypothesis 3).
For example, outgroups that are low in warmth and high in competence tend to be viewed
as competitive and invoke negative intent. In this case, such outgroups are expected to be
harmful and unfair; thus, concerns about the harm and fairness foundations may not be as
relevant because this outgroup is not violating expectations of harm and fairness (i.e.,
hypothesis 3a). Using a similar rationale, an outgroup that is viewed as low in warmth
and low in competence might invoke disgust. Since this particular outgroup is expected to
be disgusting, concerns about the purity foundation may not be as relevant because the
outgroup is not violating any expectations of purity (i.e., hypothesis 3b). While it is still
unclear how exactly differing outgroups may moderate the group’s utilization of moral
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foundations, it appears it is a likely possibility that they do. Thus, six prototypic target
outgroups were chosen based on past research of the stereotype content model for
participants to judge (i.e., two low warmth, high competent outgroups; two low warmth,
low competent outgroups; and two high warmth, low competent outgroups). Moral
judgments of these three outgroup types will be compared to moral judgments of ingroup
members, assuming ingroup members will be seen as high in both warm and competence.
Thus, in the present research, participants made judgments of moral concerns for four
different groups: a high warmth, high competent (HwHc) ingroup; a low warmth, high
competent (LwHc) outgroup (i.e., the rich or business professionals); a high warmth, low
competent (HwLc) outgroup (i.e., the elderly or housewives); and a low warmth, low
competent (LwLc) outgroup (i.e., the homeless or welfare recipients) based on a modified
version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire.

CHAPTER II
METHODS
Preliminary analysis
Power analyses were conducted using G*Power, a general power analysis
program. Power analyses were conducted for both an independent means t-test and oneway repeated measures, within factors MANCOVA with medium effect sizes and
standard power of .80. With these requirements, a sample size of at least 128 participants
was needed to provide adequate power for detecting effects for the independent means ttest and a sample size of at least 76 participants (38 participants per condition) was
needed to provide adequate power for detecting effects for the one-way repeated
measures, within factors MANCOVA. Thus, it was determined that approximately 64
participants were needed per condition, yielding a total sample of 128 for this study.
Since initial pilot tests revealed approximately 30% if the data could not be used due to
some participants potentially belonging to a group that was designed to be an outgroup,
77 additional participants were needed to ensure an adequate sample. This number was
derived by rounding up the average percent of data lost in the two within participant
conditions of the pilot study (i.e., 54%) to 60% and multiplying it by the sample of 128.
Pilot study
Prior to this experiment, a pilot study was conducted to insure the ratings across
the two instances of each outgroup (e.g., the rich and business professionals are both
11
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LwHc outgroups) did not substantially differ. The pilot test design used a total sample
of 148 participants and was comprised of nine conditions. Two of the nine conditions
included within-subject designs that asked participants to rate one ingroup and three
outgroups. The other seven conditions consisted of between-subject designs that asked
participants to rate just one group (i.e., one ingroup condition and six outgroup
conditions).
Results of the pilot test indicated groups tended to not be significantly different
between the within-participant conditions and between-participant conditions.
Specifically, a series of t-tests were conducted between each within-participant condition
and the corresponding between-participant condition on the five moral foundations (e.g.,
within-participant “the rich” target outgroup and between-participant “the rich” target
outgroup). All results were not significant except three outcomes (see appendix A). These
were the harm foundation for one of the within-participant intragroup manipulations,
t(33) = -2.32, p < .05, the harm foundation for the rich, t(22) = -2.90, p < .01, and the
loyalty foundation for the rich, t(22) = -2.16, p < .05. However, these significant results
yielded small effects. In the intragroup manipulations, participants in the withinparticipant condition scored lower on the harm foundation (M = 3.09, SD = .90) than
those in the between-participant condition (M = 3.67, SD = .57). In the rich
manipulations, participants in the within-participant condition scored lower on the harm
foundation (M = 2.56, SD = .76) and lower on the loyalty foundation (M = 2.42, SD =
.50) than those in the between-participant condition (M = 3.49, SD = .77 and M = 2.95,
SD = .66, respectively). Therefore, the pilot study demonstrated a within-participant
design could be utilized.
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Participants
Four hundred five undergraduates at Loyola University Chicago voluntarily
participated for course credit in their introductory psychology class. Participants were at
least 18 years of age and were recruited from the Loyola University Chicago psychology
participant pool. The total sample size was 410 participants, and the mean age of the
participants was 18.93 years (SD = 1.13). However, 24 participants did not include their
age. Participant ethnicity was as follows: 217 Caucasian, 73 Asian, 61 Hispanic, 15
Black, 11 Middle Eastern, and 33 either gave an invalid response or did not respond at
all. Participant sex consisted of 299 females and 88 males, while 23 either gave an invalid
respond or did not respond at all.
Key variables
This study contained two notable independent variables: outgroup sets and type of
group. Specifically, the target outgroup set participants were asked to judge was varied in
two conditions. An outgroup set was comprised of an ingroup target and three outgroup
targets based on the stereotype content model. At one level of the outgroup set,
participants rated an ingroup target (i.e., group the participant most identified with) and
three outgroup targets (i.e., the rich, housewives, and the homeless). At the second level
of the outgroup set, participants rated an ingroup target (i.e., a group the participant most
identified with) and three different outgroup targets (i.e., business professionals, the
elderly, and welfare recipients). Thus, in both levels, participants rated four different
groups. This manipulation was done to generalize beyond one group particular for each
social category of the stereotype content model.
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The second independent variable (i.e., type of group) included four levels of
group identification derived from the stereotype content model: (1) a HwHc ingroup, (2)
a LwHc outgroup, (3) a HwLc outgroup, and (4) a LwLc outgroup. These four levels of
group type were then crossed with the two levels of the outgroup set. Thus, participants
rated one HwHc ingroup (i.e., a group the participant most identified with), one LwHc
outgroup (i.e., either the rich or business professionals), one HwLc outgroup (i.e., either
housewives or the elderly), and one LwLc outgroup (i.e., either the homeless or welfare
recipients).
These particular outgroup exemplars were chosen based on past research
conducted on the stereotype content model. Specifically, these outgroups have been the
most frequently used across a number of studies that have investigated the stereotype
content model (e.g., Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009; Cuddy et al., 2009; Fiske et al.,
2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006; Lee & Fiske, 2006; Rogers, Schroder, & Scholl, 2013).
Using six distinctly different outgroups that have been shown to vary on in stereotype
content provides converging evidence of the moral foundations used when judging a
target outgroup.
To measure participants various moral concerns and judgments of these particular
groups, a modified version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire was used (Graham et
al., 2009). For this variable, participants filled out a 32-item questionnaire that has been
validated multiple times in previous research on moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011).
This measure is comprised of two subscales: 16 moral relevance items and 16 moral
judgment items. The moral relevance items entail rating various concerns (e.g., whether
or not someone was harmed) on a 6-point scale anchored by the labels never relevant and
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always relevant. For each moral foundation there are three items. An additional item
serves as a check for whether participants paid attention, understood the scale, and
responded meaningfully. High rating on this item is assumed to indicate careless or
otherwise not interpretable performance on this subscale and these data were excluded
from analysis. The moral judgment items add more contextualized, concrete items that
more strongly trigger the type of moral intuitions that are said to play an important role in
moral judgment. Similar to the moral relevance items, there are three items per moral
foundation that are rated on a 6-point scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree),
and there is additional item that serves as a check for attention, understandability of the
scale, and meaningful responses. For each foundation, moral relevance and moral
judgment items were combined to produce participants’ moral foundation scores (MFS).
As mentioned, a modified version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire was
used in the present study. The only modifications made to the questionnaire involved
minor grammatical changes due to the manipulation of group membership. Specifically,
in the original questionnaire, moral relevance items asked respondents if an act
committed by “someone” was relevant or not to their decision of whether something was
right or wrong. In the present study, these items were prefaced by asking participants to
think about a particular group (i.e., HwHc, LwHc, HwLc, and LwLc groups).
Additionally, wherever the original items mentioned “someone”, this was replaced with
the previously mentioned group or the word “they”. In terms of the moral judgment
items, in the original questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate the degree to
which they agreed or disagreed with various statements. In the modified version,
participants were asked to complete this same task while keeping in mind the typical

16
member of the same group. Since many of these statements did not suggest a single
person or persons where involved, pronouns were added so the target of the judgment
became the group the respondent was thinking about. For example, “Justice is the most
important requirement for a society” was changed to “Justice for them is the most
important requirement for a society”. Moreover, in a couple of cases, the original moral
judgment items contained a reference to the single individual, so these items were also
modified. For example, “I am proud of my country’s history” was changed to “I believe
they are proud of their country’s history”. Since participants rated four groups in each
replication conditions, there were a total of four sets of MFS for each participant.
Lastly, political orientation was measured and controlled for in the present
analyses because previous research has shown that MFS are highly correlated with
political orientation. For example, Graham and colleagues (2009) found that
conservatives and liberals rely on different sets of moral foundations. Specifically, they
found that liberals utilize the harm and foundations more than the loyalty, authority, and
purity foundations; however, conservatives tend to use all five of the foundations more
equally. Moreover, other research has shown that when disgust is prompted, social
conservatives tend to be more prejudicial against certain groups. Specifically, Terrizzi,
Shook, and Ventis (2010) demonstrated that when disgust is experimentally manipulated,
conservatives showed increased prejudicial attitudes toward contact with homosexuals
whereas liberals showed reduced prejudice. Based on prior research (e.g., Cottrell &
Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002), it was apparent some of the target outgroups used in
the current study could elicit disgust (e.g., the homeless and welfare recipients). Thus,
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political orientation was controlled for in order to examine if the effects of group type
influence participants’ MFS above and beyond political orientation.
Design
This study utilized a 2 (outgroup set 1 vs. outgroup set 2) by 4 (type of group: one
ingroup and three outgroups) design. The type of group is a within-participant factor
while the outgroup sets were manipulated between participants. In one condition,
participants rated a group they most identified with, the rich, housewives, and the
homeless. In the second condition, participants rated a group they most identified with,
business professionals, the elderly, and welfare recipients. Across conditions, the target
outgroups were matched on the two dimensions of the stereotype content model (i.e.,
warmth and competence) to control for target outgroup content. Specifically, target
outgroups perceived as incompetent and cold were the homeless and welfare recipients.
Target outgroups perceived as incompetent and warm consisted of the elderly and
housewives. Target outgroups perceived as competent and cold were the rich and
business professionals. Lastly, target groups perceived as competent and warm were
considered ingroup members. Thus, the ingroup manipulation serves as both one level of
the independent variable and the control, thereby increasing statistical power. The
primary outcome variable was participants’ MFS derived from a modified version of the
Moral Foundations Questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two replication conditions (i.e.,
outgroup set 1 or 2). After completing the informed consent form and agreeing to
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participate, participants were asked to fill out an online survey. This survey was a
modified version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire
In each condition, participants filled out the modified Moral Foundations Survey
four times, each with a different target group. The order the groups were presented was
based on a Latin square design. Once completing the survey, participants were asked to
fill out a final questionnaire that included demographic questions and manipulation
checks imbedded within those questions.
Lastly, participants filled out a demographics questionnaire that asked for their
political orientation, age, sex, and ethnicity. Imbedded in this demographic questionnaire
were questions related to the various group manipulations participants were randomly
assigned to. These questions included a rating of socioeconomic status and asked if the
participant or the participant’s family has ever held a profession in business, been
homeless, received welfare, been a housewife, and been a caretaker for the elderly. If a
participant was assigned to a particular condition in which they indicated he or she was a
potential ingroup member of one of these assumed outgroups (e.g., if a person was
assigned to a business professional manipulation and answered “yes” to the question
“have you or anyone in your family ever held a profession in the business field”), they
were excluded from the analyses.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
To ensure the accuracy of the group manipulation, a series of manipulation checks
was embedded in the final questionnaire. Specifically, a conservative one-item measure
was used to examine the potential possibility that a participant perceived one of the target
outgroups as an ingroup instead. For example, socioeconomic status was asked to gage if
participants associated themselves with “The rich” as an ingroup. Other items included
checks for business professionals (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family held a
profession in business?”), the homeless (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family been
homeless for an extended period?”), welfare recipients (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your
family received welfare?”), housewives (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family held an
occupation that consisted of caring for one’s family, managing household affairs, and
doing housework?”), and the elderly (i.e., “Have you or anyone in your family been a
caretaker for the elderly?”) outgroups. If any participant answered yes to these
manipulation checks and judged the corresponding outgroup (e.g., answered yes to
receiving welfare and judged welfare recipients in one of the outgroup sets), then this
participant’s data was excluded from further analyses.
After using the exclusionary data procedures, the sample dropped to 121
participants. Thus, the mean age of the participants used in the final data analysis was
18.9 years (SD = 1.27). Participant ethnicity for this sample was as follows: 60
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Caucasian, 25 Asian, 24 Hispanic, five Black, four Middle Eastern, and three either
gave an invalid response or did not respond at all. Participant gender for this sample
consisted of 88 females and 31 males, while two participants did not indicate their
gender. Demographics of this sample did not significantly change from the initial sample
(see appendix B).
Hotelling’s T2 was conducted to compare the two outgroup sets on the five MFS
for each target group (e.g., “the rich” in outgroup set 1 and “business professionals” in
outgroup set 2). The results showed a significant overall difference between the outgroup
sets on MFS F(1, 119) = 41.42, p < .05. However, only four comparisons reached
significance (see appendix C). These four that reached significance were the harm
foundation for HwHc ingroups, F(1, 119) = 4.85, p < .05, R2Adjusted = .031, the fairness
foundation for LwHc outgroups, F(1, 119) = 9.31, p < .01, R2Adjusted = .065, the harm
foundation for HwLc outgroups, F(1, 119) = 6.87, p = .01, R2Adjusted = .047, and the
fairness foundation for HwLc outgroups, F(1, 119) = 12.27, p = .001, R2Adjusted = .086.
Specifically, HwHc ingroups scored significantly higher on the harm foundation in the
second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set (M = 3.6, SD = .65; M = 3.9, SD =
.44, respectively), LwHc outgroups scored higher on the fairness foundation in the
second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set (M = 3.06, SD = .66; M = 2.55, SD
= .79, respectively), and HwLc outgroups scored significantly higher on the harm
foundation in the second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set (M = 3.84, SD =
.62; M = 3.43, SD = .74, respectively). HwLc outgroups also scored significantly higher
on the fairness foundation in the second outgroup set compared to the first outgroup set
(M = 3.65, SD = .61; M = 3.08, SD = .78, respectively). Since these results produced
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small effects and the order of means over the outgroup types remained consistent even
though there were some magnitude differences, reported results were collapsed across
this variable. For example, participants’ MFS for LwHc outgroups were a composite
score of those who judged the rich and of those who judged business professionals.
MFS for target outgroups were averaged into a composite outgroup score, and a
repeated-measures MANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group identity
(ingroup vs. outgroup) on MFS while controlling for political orientation. Results showed
a significant effect of group membership on the harm, F(1, 114) = 12.59, p = .001, ηp2 =
.1, fairness, F(1, 114) = 14.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, and loyalty F(1, 114) = 12.96, p <
.001, ηp2 = .1, foundations. Specifically, when rating an ingroup, participants scored
higher on the harm, fairness, and loyalty foundations compared to rating an outgroup (see
figure 1). When participants rated an ingroup, they scored lower on the authortity
foundation but higher on the purity foundation compared to when they rated an outgroup
(see figure 1). However, results for the authority and purity foundations were not
significant.
Based on these results, hypothesis 1 was not supported by the data. It was
predicted participants would score higher on the harm and fairness foundations when
rating an outgroup compared to an ingroup. However, these data do provide partial
support to hypothesis 2. It was predicted participants would score higher on the loyalty,
authority, and purity foundations when rating an ingroup compared to an outgroup.
Participants did in fact score higher on the loyalty foundation when rating an ingroup;
however, results for authority and purity foundations did not reach significance.
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Figure 1. Differences between ingroup and outgroup moral foundation scores
To further tease apart this relationship and examine if the type of outgroup
moderated the relationship between group membership and MFS, a second repeatedmeasures MANCOVA was conducted to compare the effect of group on MFS while
controlling for political orientation. Results showed the type of outgroup, based on the
stereotype content model, significantly influenced MFS on harm, F(3, 113) = 12.94, p <
.001, ηp2 = .1, fairness, F(3, 113) = 32.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, loyalty, F(3, 113) = 8.49, p
< .001, ηp2 = .07, and authority, F(3, 113) = 8.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, foundations.
Although there was not a significant effect of group membership on the purity
foundation, the results were trending towards significance F(3, 113) = 2.53, p = .057, ηp2
= .02.
Pairwise comparisons showed that ratings of LwHc outgroups were significantly
lower on harm and fairness foundations as compared to any other type of group.
Moreover, ratings of LwHc outgroups showed significantly higher MFS scores for
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authority and purity foundations, whereas LwLc outgroups exhibited significantly
lower MFS scores for authority and purity foundations, as compared to other groups.
Ratings of HwHc ingroups were shown to have the significantly highest MFS for the
loyalty foundation, whereas ratings of LwLc outgroups exhibited the significantly lowest
scores for the loyalty foundation. See figure 2 for reported results.
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3.2
HwHc

3

LwHc

2.8

HwLc

2.6

LwLc

2.4
2.2
Harm

Fairness

Loyalty
Authority
Moral foundations

Purity

Figure 2. Moral foundation score differences among group type
Based on these results, different types of groups did moderate the effect between
group identity and MFS, providing empirical support for hypothesis 3. For the harm and
fairness foundations, differences between ingroups and outgroups is mainly a function of
the LwHc outgroup. However, HwLc and LwLc outgroups were significantly different
from each other on the fairness foundation as well. For the loyalty foundation, the effect
seems to be consistent across all groups. Specifically, the HwHc ingroup scored the
highest on this foundation. For the authority foundation, differences between ingroups
and outgroups was again mainly a function of the LwHc outgroup, with this group
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scoring the highest on this foundation. Although the LwHc outgroup did not
significantly differ from the HwHc ingroup on the authority foundation, the effect was
approaching significance (p = .054). Lastly, the effect for the purity foundation appears to
be driven by the LwHc outgroup as well (see figure 2); however, the only significant
difference on this foundation was between the LwHc and LwLc outgroups.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The results from the current experiment suggest that how people judge others in
terms of moral foundations depends on how they categorize them. Whether the target is
framed as an ingroup or outgroup member influences the perceiver’s utilization of moral
foundations. However, the moral foundations used when judging these groups do not
exactly fall in line with the study’s hypotheses. Specifically, given the propensity for
groups to protect themselves and enhance their own welfare, hypothesis 1 predicted
participants would be sensitive to threats from outgroups and focus harm and fairness
foundations when judging outgroup members. However, the results demonstrated that
participants actually scored significantly lower on these foundations when rating
outgroup members compared to ingroup members. However, these low scores may still
align with the notion that ingroups are more sensitive to threats from outgroups. That is,
if one feels that an outgroup poses a threat, that individual may not consider harm and
fairness foundations to be particularly relevant to the outgroup’s perspective. Since the
outgroup can invoke negative intent (e.g., consuming resources, inflicting physical harm,
etc.), they are judged to be lower on harm and fairness foundations. In other words,
people may perceive certain outgroups as caring less about fairness and harm because
they see them as a threat.
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Moreover, based on the binding foundations derived from moral foundations
theory, hypothesis 2 predicted when judging the ingroup (as opposed to the outgroup),
participants would likely focus on the loyalty, authority, and purity foundations. The
results demonstrated that participants did in fact score significantly higher on the loyalty
foundation when judging ingroups compared to outgroups, lending partial support to
hypothesis 2. This makes sense given that loyalty, patriotism, and self-sacrifice to one’s
ingroup are significant parts of a cohesive social identity and that those who go against
the ingroup are often treated with distain (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). However, the results
showed no significant differences between the type of group and the authority and purity
foundations. On the surface, this appears to be a surprising finding. However, ingroups
and outgroups are salient entities (e.g., us versus them). In order for these groups to retain
their entitativity, both groups must show obedience and respect for authority albeit for
their respective identities. Moreover, these groups have their own leaders and afford their
own protection. Thus, they are likely to show similar levels of the authority foundation.
Moreover, practices related to purity serve social functions such as marking off the
group’s cultural boundaries (Soler, 1973/1979). Given the often salient difference of
ingroup and outgroup cultures, it seems likely ingroups and outgroups would not
significantly differ in their MFS on the purity foundation.
The results of this experiment also have implications for moderators of moral
foundations at the group level. The stereotype content model suggests that different types
of outgroups promote different expectations. Thus, hypothesis 3 predicted that differing
types of outgroups would moderate the moral foundations utilized by participants. The
results did indeed support this prediction. Specifically, for the harm and fairness
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foundations, differences between ingroups and outgroups appears to mainly a function
of the LwHc outgroup. Compared to any other type of group, LwHc groups scored the
lowest on these foundations. While the LwHc group were seen as less concerned with
harm and fairness foundations than that of the ingroup, this was not true for other types of
outgroups. Thus, how the ingroup perceives the outgroup will affect how they rate them
in terms of moral foundations.
This finding also supports hypothesis 3a: LwHc outgroups were expected to be
perceived as harmful and unfair, making concerns about the harm and fairness
foundations less relevant. This is likely due to the fact that these outgroups tend to be
viewed as competitive and invoke negative intent from the ingroup’s perspective (Fiske
et al., 2002). Thus, this type of outgroup is expected to be harmful and unfair, and is not
seen as violating expectations of harm and fairness. However, HwLc and LwLc
outgroups were significantly different from each other on the fairness foundation as well,
such that LwLc outgroups scored lower than HwLc outgroups. This is likely because
LwLc outgroups are thought to compete with the ingroup as well. However, instead of
competing for status, they are primarily viewed as competing for resources (Fiske et al.,
2002). In other words, these outgroups are often viewed as parasites in the system and are
seen as competing in a zero-sum game of resource allocation.
For the loyalty foundation, the effect seems to be consistent across all groups.
Specifically, the HwHc ingroup scored the highest on this foundation. Similar to the
explanation for hypothesis 2, this finding makes sense given that loyalty, patriotism, and
self-sacrifice to one’s ingroup are significant parts of a cohesive social identity.
Moreover, if an ingroup does not perceive its group members to be loyal, those who go
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against the ingroup are often treated with distain. To the extent ingroup members are
not loyal, they may be ostracized or even exiled from the group in order to protect the
ingroup’s welfare. Evolutionarily speaking, individuals that could come together in order
to successfully enhance and protect each other were more likely to survive. Furthermore,
social identity theory states group identification directly leads to ingroup favoritism as
well as other behaviors that differentiate one’s group from others (Hogg & Abrams,
1988). Thus, the tendency for a group to enhance and protect itself, perhaps through
loyalty, is likely present and deeply embedded in most group settings.
For the authority foundation, differences between ingroups and outgroups was
mainly a function of the LwHc outgroup, with this group scoring the highest on this
foundation. This may be due to the hierarchical structure in many business settings. In
order for such a hierarchy to effectively function, those working within the structure must
show obedience and respect for those above them in the hierarchy. It could also be true
that business professionals and the rich are often thought of as powerful leaders.
Although the LwHc outgroup did not significantly differ from the HwHc ingroup on the
authority foundation, the effect was approaching significance (p = .054).
Lastly, the effect for the purity foundation appears to be driven by the LwHc
outgroup as well; however, the only significant difference on this foundation was
between the LwHc and LwLc outgroups, with LwLc outgroups scoring lower than LwHc
outgroups. Moreover, LwLc outgroups scored the lowest on the foundation compared to
any other group. This finding supports hypothesis 3b: since LwLc outgroups invoke
disgust, concerns about the purity foundation would be less relevant compared to any
other outgroup. In this case, these outgroups may be associated with moral overtones of
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injustice, indignation, and bitterness toward illegitimate behavior. Given these groups
are often perceived to detract from others resources (Fiske et al., 2002), they might be
perceived to have hostile intent that impacts others in society. It might also be the case
that the particular target groups used in this study (i.e., welfare recipients and the
homeless) might simply be perceived to be or are associated with being physically
disgusting to others (e.g., smelly, greasy, dirty, etc.).
It might be the case that moral foundation use at the group level is driven less by
moral standards and more by stereotypic expectations. That is, when individuals have
stereotypic expectations of a particular group, the moral foundations related to those
specific expectations might not be as relevant. For example, if the ingroup perceives an
outgroup as potentially causing harm to the ingroup, the ingroup will rate the outgroup
lower on the moral foundation of harm. However, if a particular group violates its
stereotypic expectation, the moral foundation associated with that expectation becomes
more relevant.
Taken together, these findings help explain why differing groups disagree on so
many moral issues and often find it hard to understand how an ethical person could hold
the beliefs of the other side: not only do people base their moral values, judgments, and
arguments on different configurations of the five foundations depending on whether
someone is an ingroup member or an outgroup member, they also have different
configurations of moral foundations depending on the type of outgroup someone is a
member of.
While the present study provides initial evidence for the effect of group
membership on the use of moral foundations, it nevertheless has a number of limitations.
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First, participants were individuals who only imagined other groups when making their
ratings of target groups. Given the results indicated various stereotypic expectations
might be driving the utilization of moral foundations, it may be the case that when
actually interacting with another group, different moral foundations may be implemented
to differing degrees. This may especially be the case when interacting with groups whose
membership may not particularly salient (e.g., housewives, welfare recipients, business
professionals). Future research might utilize a minimal group paradigm to address this
issue.
Second, the MMM proposes an approach-avoidance component of moral
foundations. In order to provide initial evidence for moral foundations at the group level,
the present study took a more straightforward approach and did not investigate how
motivation may influence the relationship between group membership and moral
foundation configuration. Although moral foundations theory incorporates both
proscriptive and prescriptive (c.f., approach and avoidance) components into their
foundations, it may be the case that approach-avoidance motivations influence the use of
moral foundations in certain contexts. Given the current results, future research should
attempt to examine how differing forms of motivation might moderate the relationships
between group membership and moral foundations.
Third, the critiques of the MMM raise a concern about the locus of moral concern
versus the target of moral judgment. The MMM does not explicitly consider how each of
these may influence one’s utilization of moral foundations. Keeping in line with the
literature on moral foundation theory, the present study examined group-level moral
foundations as targets of moral judgment. That is, the current research framed the targets
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of moral judgment as particular groups (i.e., ingroups and outgroups). However, it may
be the case that individuals also used a locus of moral concern to derive their judgments.
For example, when individuals were asked to consider LwHc outgroups, they judged
these groups to be less concerned with harm and fairness concerns in the present study.
The target of their moral judgment was the LwHc outgroup (i.e., the rich or business
professionals) but their locus of moral concern may have been their own ingroup (i.e.,
group-protect). Moreover, Graham (2013) suggested moral foundation use might differ if
judgments are based on the locus of moral concern or targets of moral judgment. Thus,
future research should attempt to tease apart these concerns.
Lastly, the present study relied on self-report ratings. Although political identity
was measured and controlled for, an investigation of whether or not differences in moral
foundations at the group level exist implicitly as well as explicitly was not conducted.
Haidt’s (2001) social-intuitionist model, as well as recent studies of moral issues (Greene,
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009),
indicates moral judgment heavily relies on automatic processes. Future research using
implicit measurement method will be essential for understanding the ways in which
various groups make moral judgments.
As globalization continues to unfold, societies are becoming more diverse. With
such diversity come differing notions about how to regulate selfishness and how we
ought to live together. Many of the ideas on how best to solve these issues are rooted in
moral convictions. Moral foundations theory offers a useful way to conceptualize and
measure such convictions. As research on moral psychology advances, perhaps it will
clarify the role that morality plays in group thought and behavior.

APPENDIX A
PILOT TEST RESULTS
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N
Harm score*
MFQ1
Intragroup
Fairness score
MFQ1
Intragroup
Ingroup score
MFQ1
Intragroup
Authority score
MFQ1
Intragroup
Purity score
MFQ1
Intragroup

11
24

Mean
3.09
3.67

Std. Dev.
.90
.57

Std. Err.
Mean

t

Sig.

-2.32

.021

-.83

.411

.18

.861

1.60

.120

.34

.739

.27
.12

11
24

3.08
3.28

.62
.67

.19
.14

11
24

2.88
2.83

.96
.71

.29
.15

11
24

3.17
2.72

.75
.79

.23
.16

11
24

2.33
2.22

1.08
.91

.33
.19

Table 1. Intragroup conditions (one multiple group (MFQ1) and intragroup)
N
Harm score
MFQ2
Intragroup
Fairness score
MFQ2
Intragroup
Ingroup score
MFQ2
Intragroup
Authority score
MFQ2
Intragroup
Purity score
MFQ2
Intragroup

5
24

Mean
3.13
3.67

Std. Dev.
.93
.57

Std. Err.
Mean

t

Sig.

-1.72

.097

-.76

.453

-.08

.935

.40

.689

.19

.852

.42
.12

5
24

3.00
3.28

1.03
.67

.46
.14

5
24

2.80
2.83

.49
.71

.22
.15

5
24

2.87
2.72

.59
.79

.27
.16

5
24

2.30
2.22

.94
.91

.42
.19

Table 2. Intragroup conditions (one multiple group (MFQ2) and single intragroup)
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N
Harm score*
MFQ1
The rich
Fairness score
MFQ1
The rich
Ingroup score*
MFQ1
The rich
Authority score
MFQ1
The rich
Purity score
MFQ1
The rich

11
13

Mean
2.56
3.49

Std. Dev.
.76
.77

Std. Err.
Mean

t

Sig.

-2.90

.008

-.69

.495

-2.16

.042

-1.20

.245

-.46

.652

.23
.21

11
13

2.67
2.87

.39
.91

.12
.25

11
13

2.42
2.95

.50
.66

.15
.18

11
13

2.77
3.09

.63
.66

.19
.18

11
13

2.56
2.69

.90
.52

.27
.14

Table 3. The rich conditions (MFQ1 and single rich)
N
Harm score
MFQ2
Bus. Prof.
Fairness score
MFQ2
Bus. Prof.
Ingroup score
MFQ2
Bus. Prof.
Authority score
MFQ2
Bus. Prof.
Purity score
MFQ2
Bus. Prof.

5
6

Mean
3.17
3.61

Std. Dev.
.31
.97

Std. Err.
Mean

t

Sig.

-.98

.355

1.84

.100

-.17

.867

-.21

.835

.49

.633

.14
.40

5
6

3.63
2.78

.46
.95

.21
.39

5
6

3.00
3.08

.85
.76

.38
.31

5
6

2.90
3.00

.64
.86

.29
.35

5
6

2.63
2.39

.74
.87

.33
.36

Table 4. Business professionals conditions (MFQ2 and single business professionals)
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N
Harm score
MFQ1
Housewives
Fairness score
MFQ1
Housewives
Ingroup score
MFQ1
Housewives
Authority score
MFQ1
Housewives
Purity score
MFQ1
Housewives

11
6

Mean
3.24
3.11

Std. Dev.

Std. Err.
Mean

.85
.87

t

Sig.

.30

.768

-.32

.755

.32

.754

-.05

.958

-.14

.888

.26
.36

11
6

3.00
3.14

.87
.85

.26
.35

11
6

2.65
2.56

.65
.29

.20
.12

11
6

2.91
2.93

.88
.57

.26
.23

11
6

2.34
2.42

1.10
.83

.33
.34

Table 5. Housewives conditions (MFQ1 and single housewives)
N
Harm score
MFQ2
The elderly
Fairness score
MFQ2
The elderly
Ingroup score
MFQ2
The elderly
Authority score
MFQ2
The elderly
Purity score
MFQ2
The elderly

5
10

Mean
3.73
3.09

Std. Dev.

Std. Err.
Mean

.38
.95

Sig.

1.43

.175

1.88

.083

-.84

.414

1.24

.239

1.64

.125

.17
.30

5
10

3.63
2.98

.46
.69

.21
.22

5
10

2.67
2.95

.77
.53

.35
.17

5
10

3.10
2.77

.48
.50

.21
.16

5
10

3.00
2.33

.72
.75

.32
.24

Table 6. The elderly conditions (MFQ2 and single elderly)

t
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N
Harm score
MFQ1
The homeless
Fairness score
MFQ1
The homeless
Ingroup score
MFQ1
The homeless
Authority score
MFQ1
The homeless
Purity score
MFQ1
The homeless

11
15

Mean
3.32
3.66

Std. Dev.

Std. Err.
Mean

.79
.78

t

Sig.

-1.08

.289

.36

.722

.50

.625

-.22

.825

-.58

.565

.24
.20

11
15

3.60
3.47

.91
.90

.29
.23

11
15

2.70
2.55

.68
.75

.22
.19

11
15

2.69
2.76

.66
.78

.21
.20

11
15

2.48
2.72

1.08
.91

.34
.24

Table 7. The homeless conditions (MFQ1 and single homeless)
N
Harm score
MFQ2
Welfare recipients
Fairness score
MFQ2
Welfare recipients
Ingroup score
MFQ2
Welfare recipients
Authority score
MFQ2
Welfare recipients
Purity score
MFQ2
Welfare recipients

5
13

Mean
3.43
3.31

Std. Dev.
.57
.84

Std. Err.
Mean

3.50
3.17

.61
.73

.27
.20

5
13

2.40
2.45

1.09
.63

.49
.17

5
13

Sig.

.31

.760

.90

.380

-.12

.906

.78

.444

.18

.860

.26
.23

5
13

5
13

t

3.13
2.86

.46
.72

.21
.20

2.57
2.46

1.08
1.12

.48
.31

Table 8. Welfare recipients conditions (MFQ2 and single welfare recipients)

APPENDIX B
SAMPLE CHANGE
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Initial n

Initial
proportion to n

After data
exclusion n

Age

--

--

Male

88

18.9% (SD
1.13)
21.5%

31

After data
exclusion
proportion to n
18.9% (SD
1.27)
25.6%

Female

299

72.9%

88

72.7%

Caucasian

217

52.9%

60

50%

Asian

73

17.8%

25

20.7%

Hispanic

61

14.9%

24

19.8%

Black

15

.04%

5

.04%

Middle Eastern

11

.03%

4

.03%

Table 9. Proportion of sample change after exclusionary data method

APPENDIX C
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUTGROUP SETS

39

40
Independent Var.
Outgroup Set

Dependent Variable
HwHc Harm*
HwHc Fairness
HwHc Loyalty
HwHc Authority
HwHc Purity
LwHc Harm
LwHc Fairness*
LwHc Loyalty
LwHc Authority
LwHc Purity
HwLc Harm*
HwLc Fairness*
HwLc Loyalty
HwLc Authority
HwLc Purity
LwLc Harm
LwLc Fairness
LwLc Loyalty
LwLc Authority
LwLc Purity

Table 10. Hotelling’s T2 results for outgroup sets on MFS

F
4.846
3.240
.298
1.268
.063
1.843
9.313
2.029
.031
.544
6.873
12.267
3.214
.081
.663
1.689
2.311
3.677
3.772
.320

Sig.
.030
.074
.586
.262
.802
.177
.003
.157
.861
.462
.010
.001
.076
.777
.417
.196
.131
.058
.055
.573
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